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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
)
V.
)
KANE LEE SIMONS,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _)
STATE OF IDAHO,

NOS. 47461-2019 & 47462-2019
BANNOCK COUNTY NOS.
CR03-19-1667 & CR-2018-2529
APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Kane L. Simons was on probation when he committed another offense. The district court
revoked his probation and imposed a consecutive sentence for the new offense. Mr. Simons then
filed an Idaho Criminal Rule 35 ("Rule 35") motion. The district court granted the motion in part
by retaining jurisdiction ("a rider"). Mr. Simons now appeals. He argues the district court abused
its discretion in its sentencing, probation revocation, and Rule 35 decisions.
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Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
In late 2018, Mr. Simons pled guilty to burglary, and the district court placed him on
probation for three years, with an underlying sentence of four years, with two years fixed. (No.
47462 R., 1 pp.90-91, 99-102.)
In February 2019, the State filed a criminal complaint alleging Mr. Simons committed
attempted robbery. (No. 47461 R., pp.8-9.) According to the Presentence Investigation Report
("PSI"), Mr. Simons was involved in a shooting-Mr. Simons agreed to be the driver for his
friends who were going to take back a gun from the alleged victim, but Mr. Simons was unaware
that his friends were going to, and did, tase and shoot the victim. (No. 47461 PSI,2 pp.3--4.) The
State later amended the complaint to conspiracy to commit robbery. (No. 47461 R., pp.73-74.)
The State also moved for a probation violation in the burglary case. (No. 47462 R., pp.114-15,
116-18.) Mr. Simons waived a preliminary hearing, and the magistrate bound him over to
district court. (No. 47461 R., pp.97, 98, 99-100.) The State filed an Information charging
Mr. Simons with conspiracy to commit robbery. (No. 47461 R., pp.102-03.)
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Simons pled guilty to an amended charge of accessory
to aggravated battery. (No. 47461 R., pp.121-22, 133-34, 136; Tr. Vol. I, 3 p.3, Ls.11-15.)
Mr. Simons also admitted to multiple probation violations for failing to report for a DNA sample
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There are two clerk's records on appeal. Citations to "No. 47461 R." reference the clerk's
record in Bannock County No. CR03-19-1667, and Citations to "No. 47462 R." reference the
clerk's record in Bannock County No. CR-18-2529.
2
There are two PSis on appeal. Citations to "No. 47461 PSI" reference the twenty-three page
PSI for Bannock County No. CR03-19-1667, titled "Appeal-Confidental Documents Exhibits
PSI Volume 1." Citations to "No. 47462 PSI" reference the thirty-five page PSI for Bannock
County No. CR-18-2529, titled "Appeal PSI Volume 1."
3
There are two transcripts on appeal. The first, cited as Volume I, contains a joint entry of plea
and admit/deny hearing, held on July 8, 2019, and a joint sentencing and disposition hearing,
held on August 26, 2019. The second, cited as Volume II, contains the Rule 35 motion hearing,
held on January 28, 2020.
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and thumbprint, failing to engage in mental health treatment, committing the new offense,
associating with persons involved in criminal activity, changing his residence, missing an
appointment with his probation officer, and leaving the district. (Tr. Vol. I, p.8, L.25-p.11, L.5.)
In late August 2019, the district court held a joint sentencing and disposition hearing.
Mr. Simons requested the district court place him on probation for both cases. (Tr. Vol. I, p.12,
Ls.22-23.) If the district court declined probation, Mr. Simons requested the district court
impose no more than one year on the fixed portion of his sentence for accessory to aggravated
battery. (Tr. Vol. I, p.14, Ls.7-22.) At the time, Mr. Simons expressed to the district court that he
did not want to participate in a rider. (Tr. Vol. I, p.22, L.13-p.14, L.6.) The State recommended
the district court sentence Mr. Simons to five years, with two years fixed, for accessory to
aggravated battery. (Tr. Vol. I, p.15, Ls.18-23.) The State also recommended the district court
revoke Mr. Simons's probation, impose that four-year sentence, and run the sentences
concurrently.

(Tr.

Vol.

I, p.18, Ls.5-8.) The district

court exceeded the parties'

recommendations. The district court revoked Mr. Simons's probation for burglary and imposed
his sentence of four years, with two years fixed. (Tr. Vol. I, p.34, L.24-p.35, L.7; No. 47462
R., pp.131-32. 4) For accessory to aggravated battery, the district court sentenced Mr. Simons to
five years, with three years fixed, to be served consecutive to the burglary sentence. (Tr. Vol. I,
p.34, Ls.3-5, p.34, Ls.17-18; No. 47461 R., pp.140--42.) In total, the district court imposed an
aggregate sentence of nine years, with five years fixed.
Mr. Simons timely appealed from the district court's judgment of conviction and its order
revoking probation. (No. 47461 R, pp.144--46; No. 47462 R., pp.133-35.) Mr. Simons also filed
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The district court's order on probation violation contains a typographical error on the length of
sentence for burglary. The order incorrectly states that Mr. Simons's sentence consisted of six
years, with two years fixed. (No. 47462 R., p.131.)
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a Rule 35 motion in each case. (No. 47461 R., p.165; No. 47462 R., p.147.) On the burglary
case, Mr. Simons requested the district court retain jurisdiction. (No. 47462 R., p.147.) On the
accessory to aggravated battery case, Mr. Simons requested the district court reduce his fixed
time to one year fixed, order the sentences to run concurrently, and retain jurisdiction. (No.
47461 R., p.165.)
In January 2020, the district court held a hearing on Mr. Simons's motions. (Aug.
R., pp.8-9; see generally Tr. Vol. II.) At the end of the hearing, the district court took the matter
under advisement. (Tr. Vol. II, p.9, Ls.7-16.) In early February 2020, the district court issued a
decision granting Mr. Simons's Rule 35 motions in part by retaining jurisdiction. (Aug. R., pp.16.) The district court declined to reduce Mr. Simons's sentence for accessory to aggravated
battery or run the sentences concurrently. (Aug. R., p.6.) The district court issued an order in
each case amending the judgments to include a period of retained jurisdiction. (Aug. R., pp. I 0,
12.)

ISSUES
I.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Mr. Simons's probation for
burglary?

II.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it sentenced Mr. Simons to five years,
with three years fixed, for accessory to aggravated battery?

III.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Simons's Rule 35 motion to
reduce his sentence for accessory to aggravated battery and run it concurrently?
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ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Revoked Mr. Simons's Probation For Burglary
The district court is empowered by statute to revoke a defendant's probation under
certain circumstances. LC. §§ 19-2602, -2603, 20-222. The Court uses a two-step analysis to
review a probation revocation proceeding. State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 105 (2009). First, the
Court determines "whether the defendant violated the terms of his probation." Id. Second, "[i]f it
is determined that the defendant has in fact violated the terms of his probation," the Court
examines "what should be the consequences of that violation." Id. The determination of a
probation violation and the determination of the consequences, if any, are separate analyses. Id.
Here, Mr. Simons does not challenge his admission to violating his probation. (Tr. Vol. I,
p.8, L.25-p.11, L.5.) "[W]hen a probationer admits to a direct violation of his probation
agreement, no further inquiry into the question is required." State v. Peterson, 123 Idaho 49, 50
(Ct. App. 1992) (citation omitted). Rather, Mr. Simons submits the district court abused its
discretion by revoking his probation.
"After a probation violation has been proven, the decision to revoke probation and
pronounce sentence lies within the sound discretion of the trial court." State v. Roy, 113 Idaho
388, 392 (Ct. App. 1987). "A judge cannot revoke probation arbitrarily," however. State v. Lee,
116 Idaho 38, 40 (Ct. App. 1989). "The purpose of probation is to give the defendant an
opportunity to be rehabilitated under proper control and supervision." State v. Mummert, 98
Idaho 452, 454 (1977). "In determining whether to revoke probation a court must consider
whether probation is meeting the objective of rehabilitation while also providing adequate
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protection for society." State v. Upton, 127 Idaho 274, 275 (Ct. App. 1995). The court may
consider the defendant's conduct before and during probation. Roy, 113 Idaho at 392.
In this case,

Mr. Simons submits the district court abused its discretion

revoking his probation because his probation was achieving its rehabilitative objective. Although
Mr. Simons committed the new offense of accessory to aggravated battery, Mr. Simons had
developed a plan to succeed on probation. Mr. Simons hoped to arrange an interstate compact to
Utah and be closer to his family. (Tr. Vol. I, p.19, Ls.7-9.) His father lived in Utah. (No. 47461
PSI, p.10.) Mr. Simons explained, "Under my dad's supervision, I never had that problem [of
hanging out with the wrong crowd] the whole time I was down in Utah versus here." (Tr. Vol. I,
p.20, Ls.8-9.) Mr. Simons recognized that he made the decision to stay friends with the "wrong
people" in Idaho, but he believed that he could get back on track and away from those influences
if he moved to Utah. (Tr. Vol. I, p.20, Ls.18-22, p.21, Ls.3-10.) Since his time in jial,
Mr. Simons had reconnected with his parents and his siblings. (Tr. Vol. I, p.28, Ls.19-25.) See
State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594-95 (1982) (family support and good character as

mitigation); see State v. Ball, 149 Idaho 658, 663-64 (Ct. App. 2010) (district court considered
family and friend support as mitigating circumstance). With that family support, Mr. Simons
could be rehabilitated under proper control and supervision.
In addition, Mr. Simons was amenable to treatment and accepted responsibility for his
actions. The impact of substance abuse on the defendant's criminal conduct is "a proper
consideration in mitigation of punishment upon sentencing." State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 414
n.5 (1981). In addition, acceptance of responsibility, remorse, and regret are all factors in favor
of mitigation. Shideler, 103 Idaho at 595. Here, Mr. Simons was diagnosed with depression and
anxiety. (No. 47461 PSI, p.18.) He also had been using methamphetamine since he was
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(No. 47461 PSI, pp.18-19.) He was very interested in mental health treatment and
drug testing while on probation (Tr. Vol. I, p.21, L.11-p.22, L.3; No. 47461 PSI, p.18.) On the
most recent offense, he felt terrible and "wish [he] could take it back." (No. 47461 PSI, p.4.) He
stated that the original plan was only to take the gun from the victim, and he had no intention for
anyone to be shot. (No. 47461 PSI, p.4; Tr. Vol. I, p.22, Ls.4-24.) See State v. Mitchell, 77 Idaho
115, 118 (1955) (lack of criminal intent as a mitigating factor). Nonetheless, Mr. Simons
accepted responsibility for his actions. (Tr. Vol. I, p.19, L.4.) He explained, "I was just helping
out a friend. The better choice would be not to hang out with those type of people." (Tr. Vol. I,
p.25, Ls.8-10.) Mr. Simons's amenability to treatment and statements of remorse, regret, and
acceptance of responsibility showed that he had the tools to succeed in the community under
proper control and supervision.
In light of these facts, Mr. Simons maintains the district court did not exercise reason and
therefore abused its discretion by revoking his probation for burglary. The district court should
have reinstated his probation in order for Mr. Simons to obtain an interstate compact to Utah.

II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Sentenced Mr. Simons To Five Years, With
Three Years Fixed, For Accessory To Aggravated Battery
"It is well-established that ' [w ]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an appellant has
the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court imposing the
sentence."' State v. Pierce, 150 Idaho 1, 5 (2010) (quoting State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294
(1997) (alteration in original)). Here, Mr. Simons's sentence does not exceed the statutory
maximum. See I.C. § 18-206 (five-year maximum for accessory). Accordingly, to show the
sentence imposed was unreasonable, Mr. Simons "must show that the sentence, in light of the
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governing criteria, is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts." State v. Strand, 13 7
Idaho 457, 460 (2002).
"'Reasonableness' of a sentence implies that a term of confinement should be tailored to
the purpose for which the sentence is imposed." State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 483 (2012)
(quoting State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148 (2008)).
In examining the reasonableness of a sentence, the Court conducts an independent
review of the entire record available to the trial court at sentencing, focusing on
the objectives of criminal punishment: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of
the individual and the public; (3) possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment
or retribution for wrongdoing.

Stevens, 146 Idaho at 148. "A sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the
pnmary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of
deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution." State v. Delling, 152 Idaho 122, 132 (2011). Similarly,
"[t]he choice of probation, among available sentencing alternatives, is committed to the sound
discretion of the trial court .... " State v. Landreth, 118 Idaho 613, 615 (Ct. App. 1990).
Here, Mr. Simons asserts the district court did not exercise reason and thus abused its
discretion by imposing an excessive sentence under any reasonable view of the facts.
Specifically, he contends the district court should have placed him on probation in light of the
mitigating factors. Mr. Simons incorporates and respectfully refers this Court to the mitigating
factors discussed in Part I. As explained in Part I, Mr. Simons had a plan to succeed on probation
and a supportive family. Further, he was amenable to treatment for his mental health and
substance abuse issues. In addition, although he had no knowledge ofhis friend's plan to shoot to
the victim, he accepted responsibly and expressed remorse for any harm. Proper consideration of
these mitigating factors supported a more lenient sentence of probation. Therefore, Mr. Simons
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maintains the district court abused its discretion by declining to place him on probation for
accessory to aggravated battery.

III.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Simons's Rule 35 Motion To
Reduce His Sentence For Accessory To Aggravated Battery And Run It Concurrently5
"A Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence is essentially a plea for leniency, addressed
to the sound discretion of the court." State v. Carter, 157 Idaho 900, 903 (Ct. App. 2014).
Likewise, "[t]he decision of whether to impose sentences concurrently or consecutively is within
the sound discretion of the trial court." State v. Helms, 130 Idaho 32, 35 (Ct. App. 1997); see

also LC. § 18-308.
In reviewing the grant or denial of a Rule 35 motion, the Court must "consider the entire
record and apply the same criteria used for determining the reasonableness of the original
sentence." Id. The Court "conduct[s] an independent review of the record, having regard for the
nature of the offense, the character of the offender and the protection of the public interest."

State v. Burdett, 134 Idaho 271, 276 (Ct. App. 2000). "Where an appeal is taken from an order
refusing to reduce a sentence under Rule 35," the Court's scope of review "includes all
information submitted at the original sentencing hearing and at the subsequent hearing held on
the motion to reduce." State v. Araiza, 109 Idaho 188, 189 (Ct. App. 1985). "When presenting a
Rule 35 motion, the defendant must show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or
additional information subsequently provided to the district court in support of the Rule 35
motion." State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007).

5

Mr. Simons does not challenge the district court's decision on his Rule 35 motion on the
burglary case because he received his requested relief (arider).
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Here, Mr. Simons argues the district court abused its discretion by failing to grant, in full,
his Rule 35 motion for accessory to aggravated battery. Although the district court granted his
request for a rider, (Aug. R., p.6), the district court denied his request to reduce his fixed time
from three years to one year and to run the sentences concurrently, (Aug. R., p.6; No. 47461
R., p.165). Mr. Simons submits the new and additional information provided at the Rule 35
motion hearing supported these requests for a fixed time reduction and concurrent sentences. For
example, he informed the district court that he ordered books to complete his GED. (Tr. Vol. II,
p.5, L.19-p.6, L.2.; Aug. R., p.4.) He also discussed his changed attitude with respect to the rider
program. (Tr. Vol. II, p.4, Ls.11-12, p.6, Ls.6-10.) He explained: "I was mainly irritated [at
sentencing] .... I wanted to go - go to Utah and do what I wanted to do, try and fix my life on
my own; and I realize that so far doing stuff on my own hasn't worked out." (Tr. Vol. II, p.6,
Ls.6-10.) Similarly, he stated, "I want my life back. I want my family back. I don't want to be
the guy who spends 20-plus years in prison till he finally gets it." (Tr. Vol. II, p.8, Lsl 6-18.) He
also informed the district court that he moved from one jail, where he was mostly in lockdown,
to another jail, where he did not get any disciplinary "write-ups." (Tr. Vol. II, p.7, Ls.10-13.) He
was "following all the rules" and "trying to make the best of my situation now." (Tr. Vol. II, p.7,
Ls.13-15.) Lastly, his attorney told the district court that Mr. Simons felt like he had "leveled
out" because he was "on all of his meds" for his mental health issues. (Tr. Vol. II, p.5, Ls.6-7.)
This new and additional information supported his requests for a fixed time reduction and
concurrent sentences. Therefore, Mr. Simons argues the district court abused its discretion by not
granting his Rule 35 motion in full.
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CONCLUSION
On the burglary case, Mr. Simons respectfully requests this Court vacate the district
court's order revoking his probation and remand his case to the district court for an order
reinstating his probation or a new disposition hearing.
On the accessory to aggravated battery case, Mr. Simons respectfully requests this Court
reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate. In the alternative, he respectfully requests this Court
vacate the district court's judgment of conviction or its Rule 35 order and remand his case for a
new sentencing or Rule 3 5 motion hearing.
DATED this 31 st day of March, 2020.

/s/ Jenny C. Swinford
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 31 st day of March, 2020, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
JCS/eas

11

